This paper provides a new rationalization for deposit insurance and systemic disintermediations. I consider an environment in which borrowers face no penalty for failing to repay obligations except the loss of their collateral. I assume that this collateral has aggregate risk. For a subset of the exogenous parameters, I demonstrate that an optimal arrangement features deposit insurance. For a strictly smaller set of parameters, it is optimal in some states of the world to have systemic distintermediations and concomitant falls in real output.
Introduction
In most developed economies, bank loans are explicitly guaranteed by deposit insurance. Why should these loans be guaranteed, while other modes of finance like corporate bonds and stock are not? In this paper, I focus on one aspect of bank loans that makes them different from other forms of finance: repayment of bank loans is enforced primarily through the use of collateral. I show that if aggregate shocks affect the value of this collateral, then it is optimal to insure owners of bank assets against poor bank loan performance, even when the owners are risk-neutral.
My specific approach is as follows. I construct a simple model economy. In the economy, one group of agents (borrowers) has projects. Another group of agents (depositors) has the resources to operate the projects. The projects have three stages: an ex-ante investment stage, an interim investment stage, and ex-post pay off stage. There are three key frictions. First, it is impossible to collect resources from the borrowers other than their collateral. Second, the value of the borrowers' collateral may be subject to aggregate shocks that are realized after the ex-ante investment stage but before the interim investment stage. Finally, the depositors cannot commit ex-ante to a level of investment in the interim stage. I consider the efficient financing and investment arrangements in this model economy.
I demonstrate that these optimal arrangements have three important features. First, if the ex-post quality of collateral and project returns are known only to the borrower, any optimal repayment contract takes the form of a collateralized debt contract. Second, for a subset of the parameter space, it is optimal to have deposit insurance. Finally, for a strictly smaller subset of the parameter space, it is optimal to have systemic disintermediation (that is, no funding of the borrowers' projects in the interim stage) in some states of the world.
The intuition behind the deposit insurance result is simple. Initially, depositors are willing to invest their money in borrowers' projects because they anticipate that the borrowers' collateral is sufficiently good for them to get a good return on their deposits. Then, the depositors see a public aggregate shock to the value of the collateral, and learn that the collateral's value is lower on average than they expected. Given this observation, the depositors may not supply additional funds to the projects.
But the shock has not necessarily affected the projects' social return -only the ability of the depositors to share in this social return. This means that from a social point of view, it is optimal to make sure that the depositors are not deterred from investing more, even though the threat of project insolvency has grown. Deposit insurance accomplishes this goal by guaranteeing the depositors their return, even when many borrowers default on their loans. 1 Thus, this paper rationalizes an insurance scheme in which falls in aggre- 1 The role of depositors in this paper is that they provide resources for entrepreneurs. What I term depositors could well be any type of bank asset owner (including equityholders or debtholders). Hence, the paper rationalizes transfers from taxpayers to all bank owners when collateral values fall.
gate collateral value trigger large payments from insurers to depositors. Two examples illustrate that this type of insurance appears to be an important component of real-life bail-outs of banking systems. During the 1980's in Texas and Louisiana, there were large transfers made from taxpayers to depositors under the aegis of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (and, later, the Resolution Trust Corporation). More recently, the Japanese government has authorized large transfers from taxpayers to depositors in an attempt to resolve the banking crisis in that country. In both cases (the largest banking bailouts ever made), the depositors' difficulties were preceded temporally by large falls in the value of the collateral backing the loans. (Land and unextracted oil was the collateral in Texas and Louisiana, while land was the collateral in Japan.) This paper is based on the growing literature concerning borrower-lender relationships in the presence of enforcement limitations. For example, my paper focuses on the optimal contracting problem between a borrower and a lender, given that the former can divert the returns of his investment project. In an important recent paper, Hart and Moore (1998) analyze a richer version of this type of contracting problem. However, they do not embed it into a societal context as I do in this paper. As well, while debt emerges as an optimal contract for some parameter specifications in their model, there are always non-debt contracts that are also optimal. This is because they abstract from asymmetric information about the value of collateral. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) analyze the effects of collateral constraints on aggregate fluctuations. In their model, the value of collateral is endogenous, and this endogeneity plays a crucial role in generating large effects of collateral constraints on output. In my framework, collateral values are exogenous, and so the effects emphasized by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) are not present.
Several authors have considered optimal repayment contracts in the presence of collateral (see Lacker (1998) , Rampini (1998), and Diamond (1984) ). However, their approach is quite different from mine. In their models, project returns are ex-post unobservable and the value of collateral is observable. Collateral is then used as a crude screening device to determine whether project returns are high or low. There are no enforcement frictions. In my setting, project returns might well be known a priori; the contracting problem is to figure out how to force the entrepreneur to share those returns with his lenders.
There is also, of course, a vast literature concerning deposit insurance. Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , this literature typically rationalizes deposit insurance as an optimal way for governments to get around a sequential service constraint faced by banks.
2 I view my "risky-collateral" rationalization of deposit insurance as being a complement to, not a substitute for, DiamondDybvig's "sequential-service" rationalization. As I emphasize later in the paper, in a world with both sequential service constraints and collateral shocks, deposit insurance payments would be conditioned on both withdrawal shocks 2 See Bryant (1980) and Chari and Jagannathan (1988) among others. Smith and Wang (1998) provide a different rationalization of deposit insurance based on costly state verification in a two-period setting. Wallace (1988) provides a theoretical critique of Diamond and Dybig's rationalization of deposit insurance.
(as in Diamond-Dybvig) , and on collateral shocks (as in this paper).
My paper is perhaps most similar to that of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) . In their paper, as in mine, borrowers need an intermediate infusion of funds for their projects. Also like my paper, there are two key enforcement constraints: lenders cannot commit ex-ante to providing these funds at the interim stage, and borrowers cannot commit, at the interim stage, to fully repay the ex-post proceeds of the project. Despite this similarity between our models, we arrive at different results. I argue for ex-post insurance of lenders. Holmstrom and Tirole argue instead for governmental liquidity provision at the interim stage. According to their scheme, the government commits ex-ante to a statecontingent pattern of taxation of lenders at the interim stage, and then passes these tax proceeds to the borrowers.
This difference in results between our two papers comes from an important difference in the way in which we model enforcement constraints. In Holmstrom and Tirole's model, governments can force lenders to pay taxes at the interim stage; the government can then pass those collected taxes on to borrowers. However, at the same time, governments cannot force lenders to honor ex-ante contracts that require them to make direct payments to borrowers at the interim stage. It is hard to understand what fundamental characteristic of the economic environment would lead to this difference in enforcement powers on the part of the government.
In contrast, in my model environment, there is an explicit physical reason why lenders cannot commit to make interim payments to borrowers. Just like other agents in the environment, governments cannot overcome this physical restriction, and so they cannot collect taxes from lenders at the interim stage. The liquidity provision scheme described by Holmstrom and Tirole is impossible, and deposit insurance instead is optimal.
Model Specification
In this section, I describe the basic environment, define a social contract, and discuss how one might interpret the model in terms of real-world entities.
Environment
Consider a one-period economy which has a continuum of agents. The agents are divided into three groups: borrowers, depositors, and outsiders. There are equal measures of the three groups.
Each borrower is endowed with a unit of an indivisible good called collateral. Only the borrower receives utility from consuming the collateral good with which he is endowed originally; hence, there are actually a continuum of different types of collateral goods. For concreteness, we can think of the collateral goods as being plots of land, on which the borrower has built a house which fits his own peculiar desires. Each depositor is endowed with one unit of divisible investment goods. Each outsider is endowed with one unit of divisible consumption goods. All agents in the economy can costlessly transform investment goods into an equivalent amount of consumption goods (but not the reverse). Besides the unit of collateral, each borrower is endowed with a project -thus, we can think of the borrowers as being entrepreneurs.
A typical borrower has preferences represented by the expected value of the utility function:
c + vh where (c, h) represent the amount of consumption and his specific collateral goods that he consumes. In these preferences, the parameter v is random and represents the quality of the borrower's collateral. Depositors and outsiders simply maximize the expected amount of consumption goods that they eat; they receive no utility from collateral goods.
The timing of events is as follows. There are three stages within the single period of time. In the first stage, (1 − λ) investment goods are invested into the projects. At the end of the first stage, an aggregate shock π is drawn from a finite set Π according to density f. The realization of π is public information. As we shall see, its realization affects the distribution of v.
At the beginning of the second stage, depositors can freely leave society with their λ units of investment goods. If a depositor does not leave the society, they can invest an additional x investment goods in a project (where 0 ≤ x ≤ λ).
In the third and final stage, the project generates R(1 − λ + x) units of consumption goods, where R is a constant. The collateral quality v is realized for each borrower. Conditional on π, v is i.i.d. across borrowers; v equals V with probability π and equals 0 with probability (1 −π). The borrower privately observes the realization of his collateral quality v. After seeing v, he can freely leave the society with the proceeds of the project, but without his collateral good.
Thus, there are three "frictions" in this environment. The first is that collateral quality is ex-post privately known only to the borrower. The other two frictions are enforcement limitations. In particular, after the second stage, depositors can leave the society, taking with them λ investment goods. After the third stage, society cannot prevent the borrower from "walking away" with the proceeds of the project. The borrower cannot expropriate the collateral good, though.
Note that society's ability to extract resources differs across agents. Outsiders are unable to walk away from any societal contract. Borrowers are able to walk away from any societal contract, but they have to lose their collateral good. Depositors can choose not to invest their remaining λ goods after learning the aggregate quality of collateral.
seem overly strong. The main results of the paper extend, though, to environments in which this assumption is relaxed. The key is that lenders and the outsiders must be less willing to substitute consumption for collateral goods than are borrowers; otherwise, it becomes a matter of social indifference whether repayment is done using consumption or collateral.
Social Contracts
In this environment, a social contract has five components. The first component is a function x(π) that describes the amount of investment goods left in each borrower's project after the aggregate shock realization π. The second component is a function c l (π) that describes the amount of consumption goods consumed by each depositor, given aggregate shock realization π. The third component c o (π) describes the amount of consumption goods consumed by each outsider given aggregate shock realization π.
The final two components are conditioned on the collateral quality realizations for each borrower. In particular, c b (π, v) is the amount of consumption of a borrower with utility parameter realizations v, given aggregate shock realization π. Finally, δ(π, v) is a dummy variable that indicates whether the borrower consumes his collateral good (δ = 1), or does not (δ = 0).
Given a social contract (x, c l , c o , c b , δ), the sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the depositors each invest (1 − λ) goods into the borrowers' projects. Then, the aggregate shock π is drawn. At that point, x(π) investment goods are invested into each borrower's project, and every borrower is left with (1 − λ + x(π)) investment goods to run their projects. Having done so, the borrowers have The above description is what happens if all agents follow the contract. However, borrowers and depositors can defect from the contract. First, immediately after the realization of π, any depositor can leave the contract with λ investment goods, which can be transformed into λ consumption goods. (Hence, defection provides the depositor with a utility of λ.) Second, after his project is run, a borrower is allowed to opt to leave the contract. If he does so, he consumes R(1 − λ + x(π)) consumption goods and 0 collateral goods.
I assume throughout that:
This means that conditional on any π, investment serves to expand the societal pie. This assumption makes it clear that any failure to invest is due to limitations on enforcement, not to any intrinsic limitations in the borrower's project. I also assume throughout that: V > R As will become clear, this guarantees that in any contract, borrowers have no incentive to walk away if their collateral quality is high.
Defining Feasibility and Optimality
In this section, I describe what social contracts are incentive-feasible: that is, incentive-compatible and physically feasible. I go on to write down a social planner's problem that characterizes the optimal social contracts from the set of incentive-feasible ones.
I define an incentive-compatible contract to be one such that for all π and v, it is weakly optimal for the borrowers not to walk away, it is weakly optimal for the depositors not to walk away, and weakly optimal for the borrowers not to lie about their collateral realization.
The conditions (1-5) respectively require that it is weakly optimal for depositors not to walk away, borrowers not to walk away (regardless of their collateral value), and weakly optimal for borrowers not to lie (regardless of their collateral value). The Revelation Principle implies that there is no loss in generality in restricting attention to incentive-compatible social contracts. Henceforth, when I use the term "social contract," I am implicitly referring to incentive-compatible social contracts.
A main goal of this paper is to characterize optimal social contracts. By "optimal," I mean social contracts that solve the following social planner's problem.
In this problem, condition (8) expresses the requirement that the depositors be no worse off than autarky (ex-ante); condition (7) expresses the same restriction for the outsiders. The next condition is the physical resource constraint. The final five constraints are the incentive-compatibility conditions.
Properties of Optimal Social Contracts
In this section, I discuss the properties of optimal social contracts. I begin by describing the linkage between the properties of contracts in the model envi-ronment and properties of banking systems in the real world. Then, I describe under what circumstances optimal contracts satisfy these properties.
Formalizing Institutions of Intermediation
The purpose of this subsection is to discuss real-world financial institutions, and define their analogues in the model environment. For example, in the real world, much bank finance is done through collateralized debt contracts, in which a borrower either pays the face value of the loan to the depositor, or, alternatively, transfers his collateral to the depositor. Thus, I define a debt contract to be a contract such that for all π:
Under this definition, the borrower's repayment (
is implicitly treated as the face value of the loan. The definition says that the borrower gives up his collateral good if his repayment falls below the face value of the debt. Note that the face value of the debt might be contingent on the realization of the aggregate state π. A crucial feature of the financial landscape in most developed economies is deposit insurance.
4 In the real world, this means that depositors are free to withdraw their deposits and are guaranteed to receive their promised return. This guarantee is backed by the taxpayers (although, potentially, it could be backed by an insurance company). In the model environment, this means that the depositors never want to withdraw their initial deposits, because the deposits are backed by taxes raised from the outsiders. Formally, I say that a social contract features deposit insurance if for some π, c o (π) < 1.
Finally, in some states of the world, it may be optimal for x(π) = 0. If we take the view that the depositors' participation in the social contract is equivalent to their depositing money in a bank, then setting x(π) = 0 is equivalent to massive withdrawals. Hence, I refer to a contract in which x(π) = 0 for some π (but not all π) as being one that features disintermediation. 
Optimality of Debt Contracts
The following proposition shows all optimal contracts are debt contracts.
4 In this environment, there is no real distinction between depositors and other owners of bank assets, like equityholders and debtholders. Hence, what I term "deposit insurance" in the context of the model can actually be interpreted as "bank owner" insurance. In reality, bailouts of other bank owners often occur concurrently with bailouts of bank depositors.
5 Throughout, I focus on properties of efficient allocations without explicitly describing how those allocations might be achieved using decentralized trade. I conjecture that these allocations are equilibrium outcomes of trading arrangements similar to those described by Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (1998) .
Proof: Suppose that δ(π, V ) = 0. Then, construct a new contract by setting δ(π, V ) = 1. This raises the borrowers' utility, and does not violate any incentive constraints. Now suppose c b (π, V ) < c b (π, 0). Then, the borrower V 's truth-telling constraint implies that δ(π, 0) = 0. (Note that this last implication relies only on incentive-compatibility, not on optimality.)
The strict optimality of debt contracts relies crucially on the assumption that the collateral quality is private information to the borrower. No repayment schedule can ask the borrower to pay anything when his collateral quality is zero, or he will walk away from the contract. This creates an incentive for the borrower to claim that his collateral good is worthless. The debt contract gets around this problem by requiring the borrower to physically give up his collateral when he does not value it.
First-Best Investment
In this subsection, I describe how if R is sufficiently large, then it is optimal to set x(π) = λ for all π, as is true if there are no incentive-compatibility conditions. I show when doing so requires the use of deposit insurance.
As will become clear, the key to all of the results is that while the total societal pie equals R(1 − λ + x), the pie that is shareable among all members of society equals πR(1−λ+x). (The rest of the pie goes directly to borrowers with poor collateral.) In order to maximize the welfare of the borrowers, it is optimal to make the scale of project operation as large as possible (because R > 1). But depositors will not be willing to do so if πR < λ unless they receive outside funds. The role of the outsiders is to provide cross-state redistribution of the shareable pie in order to get as many projects as possible off the ground.
The first proposition demonstrates that if πR ≥ λ for all π, and E(πR) ≥ 1, then in any optimal contract, x(π) = λ. Moreover, this can be achieved without deposit insurance.
Proposition 2
Suppose min π πR ≥ λ, and π πRf (π) ≥ 1. In any optimal social contract, x(π) = λ for all π, and there exists an optimal social contract such that c o (π) = 1 for all π.
Proof: Substitute the resource constraint, the depositors' ex-ante participation constraint, and the outsiders' ex-ante participation constraint into the planner's objective. Then, it is clear that for any contract with investment plan x, the borrower's ex-ante utility is bounded from above by:
This bound is maximized by setting x(π) = λ for all π, because R > 1. Thus, no contract can attain a value for the planner's objective higher than:
Now, consider the contract: The contract satisfies the social planner's constraints, and attains the upper bound B * for the planner's objective. Hence, this contract is optimal. Moreover, any contract in which x(π) < λ for some π achieves a utility lower than B(x), which is strictly less than B * . The point of this proposition is that when R is sufficiently high, then there is no need to use deposit insurance. The depositors are willing to finance all projects, because the borrowers can recompense them sufficiently using the proceeds of the project in the states in which the value of the collateral is sufficiently high.
More interesting is the case in which min π πR < λ, but π f(π)πR ≥ 1. In this case, deposit insurance is an intrinsic feature of the optimal contract. Note that this requires a non-trivial aggregate shock, because min π π < π f(π)π.
Proposition 3
If min π πR < λ, and π f(π)πR ≥ 1, then, in any optimal contract, x(π) = λ. There is no optimal contract such that c o (π) ≥ 1 for all π.
Proof: As in the proof of Proposition 2, any contract with investment plan x achieves a value for the planner's objective that is no greater than:
Also, as in the proof of Proposition 2, B(x) is bounded from above by:
where B(x) < B * if x(π) < λ for some π. Now, I construct an incentive-compatible contract in which x(π) equal to λ for all π:
This contract is optimal because it attains the upper bound B * . Moreover, any contract in which x(π) < λ for some π must achieve a lower utility, because it is bounded above by B(x) < B * . We know from the resource constraint, and from the borrowers' incentive constraints, that:
In an optimal contract, x(π) = λ for all π. Now suppose π * R < λ in some state
Under the parametric assumptions made in the proposition, deposit insurance plays an essential role in the optimal allocation of resources. It is useful to see how deposit insurance works in this setting. Consider the contract described in the proof of the above proposition. We can think of the face value of the debt as being independent of π in this case (because R − c b (π, V )) is independent of π). The depositors pay some fraction of their loan proceeds to the outsiders when π is high, and receive a transfer from the outsiders when π is low. Thus, this contract features deposit insurance.
Note that the outsiders are unhappy when π is low (just like any insurer is unhappy when it must actually provide insurance). Given the realization of π, the depositors are not withdrawing their investment goods from projects that, because of bankruptcy risk, have an expected return less than zero. Yet, they don't withdraw these goods because the outsiders will make up the shortfall. Given the realization of π, the outsiders would prefer to stop the lenders from making these loans -but this would be inefficient from an ex-ante point of view.
Optimal Disintermediation
In this subsection, I consider how the enforcement limitations can lead to a collapse of investment. The next proposition shows that if max π πR > 1 and π f(π)πR < 1, then the optimal contract features disintermediation.
Proposition 4 Suppose max
Proof: In appendix.
The intuition behind this proposition is simple. If π πRf (π) < 1, then it is not possible to set x(π) = λ for all π without driving the outsiders/lenders below their ex-ante participation constraints. On the other hand, because max π πR > 1, it is certainly possible to set x(π) = λ in at least one state. It follows that any optimal contract features disintermediation.
Note that the requirement in the proposition that there exists π * such that π≥π * f(π){πR − 1} = 0 would automatically be satisfied in a world in which f is continuous over an interval Π. Assuming that this restriction is satisfied in the finite support case simplifies the structure of the optimal contract.
Proposition 4 identifies parameter settings such that the optimal arrangement features stochastic aggregate output, even though project returns are deterministic. If the realization of π is low enough that x(π) is set equal to 0, then aggregate output equals (1 + λ + (1 − λ)R). If π is high enough that x(π) is set equal to λ, then aggregate output equals (1 + R) (which is the maximal output possible in the economy).
Discussion
In this section, I discuss some aspects of the model and results.
Viewing Japan through the Model's Lens
In this subsection, I discuss how we can interpret Japan's banking crisis using the above model. Of course, in the model, there is no explicit mention of banks or financial intermediaries. But we can think of banks which are merely "shells" (much like firms in the Arrow-Debreu setting). Funds flow through them from depositors into projects, and then project proceeds flow back again.
There are two important enforcement frictions that regulate these flows. After learning the realization of π, depositors have the ability to come to the banks and withdraw uninvested goods. The second enforcement friction is that entrepreneurs can walk away with the proceeds of the project, at the loss of some collateral.
Given this basic structure, we can interpret events in Japan around 1990-91 as follows. Depositors have given funds to financial intermediaries, who have in turn lent out a fraction (1 − λ) of these funds. Most business loans are collateralized using land. Then, the realization π of the value of land in 1991 is unexpectedly low. In particular, suppose that it is sufficiently low that πR < λ.
First, suppose that no government bailouts were anticipated. Then, depositors and bank owners would have immediately pulled out the λ investment goods still in the bank. Investment would have fallen -even though the projects themselves were still socially beneficial.
However, suppose that depositors/bank owners anticipate government bailouts. Then, the depositors/owners are insured against the fall in land value, and they find it optimal to leave the λ goods with the intermediary. The intermediary lends those goods out to businesses and they will be able to run their projects.
Thus, the implicit system of bank insurance in Japan prevented massive withdrawals, and concurrently prevented large falls in output. Of course, any model of bank insurance would generate the implication about withdrawals. The implication about output follows because of the assumption that project returns remain high despite the fall in land value.
Comparison with Diamond-Dybvig
I emphasize in this paper that bank loans are different from other forms of entrepreneurial finance because repayment is enforced via risky collateral. DiamondDybvig (1983) emphasize two other aspects of banks: the random need for liquidity on the part of bank depositors, and the banks' sequential service constraint.
6 Specifically, they assume that a random fraction of lenders need to consume before projects are actually run. The lenders' type (consume early or consume late) is private information to the lender. When a given lender shows up at the bank, the bank faces a sequential service constraint, so that it must make a payment to an early withdrawer before the number of early withdrawers is actually observed.
It is interesting to consider what happens if these two extra ingredients (privately observed preference shocks and sequential service) are added to the model in this paper. In this augmented environment, the optimal arrangement has two types of deposit insurance. The first operates as I have described above: outsiders insure lenders against aggregate collateral fluctuations.
The second type of deposit insurance operates as in Diamond-Dybvig. By assumption, the government does not face the sequential service constraint. Then, after all early withdrawers have shown up at the bank, the government taxes them, and transfers these taxes back to the bank. Two features of this latter system are crucial. The first is that the size of the tax is based on the number of early withdrawers. It is this information that gives the government an advantage over the banking system. The second is that the taxes are imposed directly on early withdrawers. It is this feature that serves to deter agents who don't need to consume early from acting as if they do.
We can summarize this analysis as follows. In a world with both the frictions described in this paper and the frictions described in Diamond-Dybvig, there are two types of deposit insurance. Lenders are insured against aggregate collateral shocks (as in my model) and they are insured against withdrawal shocks (as in Diamond-Dybvig's model). The first type of insurance must make use of the resources of outsiders, while it is important that the second type of insurance does not. Actual implementations of deposit insurance (as in the S & L crisis) more closely resemble the first type of insurance.
Moral Hazard
It is generally believed that deposit insurance creates a severe moral hazard problem. The essence of the problem is as follows. Suppose a government or a private insurer guarantees depositors a fixed return; however, the government/insurer cannot observe project choice on the part of the banks. Then, the bail-out program provides an incentive for banks to ignore downside risk when choosing among projects.
This kind of moral hazard problem does not appear in my model. It is important to understand, though, that this paper does not purport to rationalize blanket deposit guarantees. Rather, it rationalizes insurance of depositors against a particular type of shock: aggregate movements in the value of collateral. As long as the aggregate value of collateral is publicly observable, and cannot be influenced by a given depositor, this kind of insurance is immune to moral hazard or adverse selection problems. (Similarly, in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , deposit insurance is really insurance against aggregate withdrawal shocks, and so is immune to moral hazard considerations.)
Stochastic Returns
Throughout the paper, I assume that project returns are deterministic. But this is merely to simplify the exposition. In particular, suppose that R is stochastic across individuals, and the random variable π now represents an aggregate state that indexes the joint cross-sectional distribution of (R, v) . It is straightforward to prove that in any optimal allocation, x(π
This result implies that the relevant support of π is P = {π * |E(R|π = π * ) ≥ 1}. Given this fact, it is easy to derive analogs of the above Propositions. For example, the analog of Proposition 3 would say: Suppose that E(Rπ|π ∈ P ) ≥ 1, and there exists π * ∈ P such that π * E(R|π = π * ) < λ. Then, any optimal allocation features deposit insurance, and has x(π) = λ for all π in P .
Conclusions
This paper advances a new view of deposit insurance. In my model, deposit insurance is, in fact, insurance. Under the optimal system, there are states of the world in which it is common knowledge that all possible loans are unprofitable ones, in the sense that their expected repayments do not cover their initial outlay. Nonetheless, because the projects themselves are socially desirable, it is efficient for lenders to make the loans, and for taxpayers to cover the lenders' losses. Indeed, if the environment were dynamic, and the collateral shocks were persistent, this pattern of taxpayers' backing up bad loans might continue for many periods.
Ex-ante, the taxpayers were happy to sign up with the deposit insurance system because the transfers that they received from lenders/borrowers balanced their taxes. After a severe collateral shock hits, though, taxpayers are ex-post unhappy. From their point of view, it looks like the system is hemorrhaging (especially if collateral shocks are persistent), because they have to pay large taxes to keep lenders afloat. But the unhappiness of taxpayers in this situation is exactly the same as that experienced by an insurance company after a hurricane hits the Atlantic Coast. In particular, it is not a sign that the deposit insurance should be eliminated or dramatically altered.
The paper also provides a novel rationale for systemic disintermediations. Consider a setting in which the depositors place all their goods into a bank, which then lends (1−λ) goods to the borrowers. Suppose that ex-ante bankruptcy risk is severe (Σ π f(π)πR < 1). Then, borrowers can expropriate so much of their projects' payoffs that depositors are unwilling to make the initial deposits full investment always takes place (x(π) = λ for all π). In order to make sure that the borrowers' projects get run in at least some states of the world (ones with high values of π), Proposition 4 shows that it is optimal for the bank to return λ goods to the depositors in other states of the world (low values of π).
Withdrawing funds in this way appears bad, because it causes a complete collapse of investment in the economy. Moreover, even though real returns have not (necessarily) changed, real output falls. Nonetheless, what appear to be banking panics are actually part of an efficient intermediation system, given sufficient collateral risk.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
It is obvious that for any optimal contract, the lenders' participation constraint, the outsiders' participation constraint, and the resource constraint must be satisfied with equality (just give any slack resources to the borrower). Let x be the investment policy of some contract which satisfies the borrowers' walk-away constraints and the borrowers' non-negativity constraints. To satisfy the ex-ante participation constraints of the outsiders/lenders, this contract must satisfy the constraint:
Substituting the resource constraint, and the lenders'/outsiders' ex-ante participation constraints into the objective, the utility of any contract which satisfies all of these constraints with equality is given by B(x), where:
This means that the optimal contract cannot attain a higher value than the solution to the maximization problem P : The first FOC then implies that any solution to P has the form x * (π) = λ for all π > π c , and x * (π) = 0 for all π < π c , where (R − 1 + µ(π c R − 1)) = 0.
In order to satisfy the resource constraint, this means that the unique x * that solves P is one in which x * (π) = λ for all π ≥ π * and x * (π) = 0 for all π < π * , where π * is defined so as to satisfy the expression π≥π * f(π)(πR − 1) = 0. This analysis tells us that if there is any element of the planner's constraint set with an investment plan x * , all optimal contracts must have this investment plan. To complete the proof, we need to construct an element of the planner's constraint set such that the investment plan is x * . But the following contract does this: 
